A model has been developed to study the complex global dynamics of a series of blackouts in power transmission systems. This model includes a simple level of selforganization by incorporating the growth of power demand, the engineering response to system failures, and the upgrade of generator capacity. Two types of blackouts have been identified, each having different dynamical properties. One type of blackout involves the loss of load due to transmission lines reaching their load limits but no line outages. The second type of blackout is associated with multiple line outages. The dominance of one type of blackout over the other depends on operational conditions and the proximity of the system to one of its two critical points. The model shows a probability distribution of blackout sizes with power tails similar to that observed in real blackout data from North America.
I. Introduction
Power transmission systems are complex systems that evolve over years in response to the economic growth of the country and to continuously increasing power demand.
The evolution and reliability of these systems are leading engineering accomplishments of the last century that underpin developed societies. Nevertheless, widespread disturbances of power transmission systems that have significant cost to society are consistently present. An analysis of blackouts 1 done in the 1970s indicated that the average frequency of blackouts in the United States was one every 14 days. More recent analyses 2,3 of 15 years of North American Electrical Reliability Council (NERC) data on blackouts of the North American power grid 4 gave an average frequency of blackouts of one every 13 days. Furthermore, these analyses show that the distribution of blackout sizes has a power tail with an exponent of about -1.3±0.2. These results indicate that the probability of large blackouts is relatively high. Indeed, although large blackouts are rarer than small blackouts, it can be argued that their higher societal costs, together with their relatively high probability, makes the risk of large blackouts comparable to or exceeding the risk of small blackouts. 5 Individual blackouts are triggered by random events ranging from equipment failures and bad weather to vandalism. 4 The blackouts typically become widespread by a series of cascading events. However, we emphasize that individual blackouts occur in a power transmission system that is slowly and dynamically evolving in its design, configuration and operation. For example, the loading of system components relative to their maximum loading is a key factor governing the propagation of component failures and this loading evolves as the system components or operational policies are upgraded. The existence of a power tail in the distribution of blackouts suggests that the underlying cause of large-scale blackouts may lie in the existence of correlations induced by the proximity to the critical point. The size of the blackout is are unrelated to the particular triggering event that initiated blackout.
To investigate such a possibility, we propose a model for power transmission systems 6, 7 that involves not only the dynamics of the generator dispatch but also the evolution of the system under a continuous increase in demand. This model shows how the slow opposing forces of load growth and network upgrades in response to blackouts could self-organize the power system to a dynamic equilibrium. Blackouts are modeled by overloads and outages of transmission lines determined in the context of linear programming (LP) dispatch of a DC load flow model. This model shows complex dynamical behaviors and has a variety of transition points as a function of increasing power demand. 8 Some of these transition points have the characteristic properties of a critical transition. That is, when the power demand is close to a critical value, the probability distribution function (PDF) of the blackout size has an algebraic tail, and the system changes sharply across the critical point. The risk of a global blackout increases sharply at the critical transition.
The fact that, on one hand, there are critical points with maximum power flow through the network and, on the other hand, there is a self-organization process that tries to maximize efficiency and minimize risk, may lead to a power transmission model governed by self-organized criticality (SOC). 9 Such a possibility was first explored with a simple cellular automaton model 10 that incorporates neither the circuit equations nor the type of long-term dynamics discussed above. In this paper, we study the dynamical properties of a power transmission model 6, 7 that incorporates these two components.
There have been some other complex system approaches to power system blackouts.
In the most closely related work, Chen and Thorp 11,12 modeled power system blackouts using DC load flow and LP dispatch and represent in detail hidden failures of the protection system. The distribution of power system blackout size was obtained by rareevent sampling, and blackout risk assessment and mitigation methods are studied. Stubna components but propagate failures along the transmission lines of a power systems network with a fixed probability.
Numerical simulations study the effect of the propagation probability and maintenance policies that reduce the probability of hidden failures. DeMarco 16 and
Parrilo et al. 17 addressed the challenging problem of determining cascading failure due to dynamic transients by using hybrid nonlinear differential equation models. Demarco used Lyapunov methods applied to a smoothed model; Parrilo et al. used KarhunenLoeve and Galerkin model reduction.
The operation of power transmission systems results from a complex dynamical process in which a diversity of opposing forces regulate both the maximum capabilities of the system components and the loadings at which they operate. These forces enter in a highly nonlinear manner and may cause a self-organization process to be ultimately responsible for the regulation of the system. This view of a power transmission system considers not only the engineering and physical aspects of the power system, but also the engineering, economic, regulatory, and political responses to blackouts and increases in load power demand. A detailed incorporation of all these aspects of the dynamics into a single model would be extremely complicated if not intractable due to the human interactions involved. However, it is useful to consider simplified models with some approximate overall representation of the opposing forces in order to gain some understanding of the complex dynamics in such a self-organized framework and the consequences for power system planning and operation.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 
Dynamical model for power transmission
In modeling the dynamics of power transmission systems, we consider two intrinsic time scales. There is a slow time scale, of the order of days to years, over which load power demand slowly increases. Over this time scale, the network is upgraded in engineering responses to blackouts and in providing more generator power in response to demand. As we shall see, these slow opposing forces of load increase and network upgrade self-organize the system to a dynamic equilibrium. The dynamical properties of this model are the main topic of this paper. In power transmission systems, there is also a fast time scale, of the order of minutes to hours, over which power is dispatched through the network within which (depending on the conditions of the network) cascading overloads or outages may lead to a blackout.
Over the fast time scale, we solve the standard DC power flow equation for a given distribution of load demand. We use the standard LP method [18] [19] [20] with the usual constraints on generating power capability and transmission line limits to solve the generator power dispatch. An example of a power transmission network used in these studies is the IEEE 118 bus network 21 shown in Fig. 1 . Details on the fast dynamics can be found in Refs. 6 and 7 and a summary description is given in Appendix A.
In any network, the network nodes (buses) are either loads (L) (gray squares in Fig. 1) , or generators (G), (black squares in Fig. 1 ). The power P i injected at each node is positive for generators and negative for loads, and the maximum power injected is P i max .
The transmission line connecting nodes i and j has power flow F ij , maximum power flow The slow dynamics proposed in Refs. 6 and 7 has three components: (1) the growth of the demand, (2) response to blackouts by upgrades in the grid transmission capability and (3) response to increased demand by increasing maximum generator power. These components of the model are translated into a set of simple rules. We simplify the time scale by regarding one blackout to be possible each day at the peak loading of that day.
At the beginning of the day t, we apply the following rules 1. The demand for power grows. All loads are multiplied by a fixed parameter l that represents the daily rate of increase in electricity demand. On the basis of past electricity consumption in the United States, we estimate that l = 1.00005. This value corresponds to a yearly rate of 1.8%.
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To represent the daily local fluctuations in power demand, all power loads are multiplied by a random number r, such that 2 -£ £ g g r , with 0 £ g £ 2.
2. The power transmission grid is improved. We assume a gradual improvement in the transmission capacity of the grid in response to outages and blackouts. This improvement is implemented through an increase of F ij max for the lines that have overloaded during a blackout. That is,
if the line ij overloads during a blackout. We take m to be a constant.
It is customary for utility engineers to make prodigious efforts to avoid blackouts, and especially to avoid repeated blackouts with similar causes. These responses to blackouts occur on a range of time scales longer than one day. Responses include repair of damaged equipment, more frequent maintenance, changes in operating policy away from the specific conditions causing the blackout, installing new equipment to increase system capacity, and adjusting or adding system alarms or controls. The responses reduce the probability of events in components related to the blackout, either by lowering their probabilities directly or by reducing component loading by increasing component capacity or by transferring some of the loading to other components. The responses are directed toward the components involved in causing the blackout. Thus the probability of a similar blackout occurring is reduced;
at least until load growth degrades the improvements that were made. There are similar but less intense responses to unrealized threats to system security, such as near misses and simulated blackouts.
Here, we have simplified all engineering responses into a single parameter m.
This is a crude representation of all these responses to a blackout. The response is modeled as happening on the next day, but the effect is eventually cancelled by the slow load increase. Because of the disparity between these two time scales, it does not seem crucial to have an accurate estimate of the response time, and the one-day time scale may be reasonable.
3. The maximum generator power is increased as a response to the load demand as follows (a) The increase in power is quantized. This may reflect the upgrade of a power plant or added generators. The increase is taken to be a fixed ratio to the total power.
Therefore, we introduce the quantity
where, P T is the total power demand and k is a parameter that we have taken to be a few percent.
(b) To be able to increase the maximum power in node j, the sum of the power flow limits of the lines connected to j should be larger than the existing generating power plus the addition at node j. This requirement maintains the coordination of the maximum generator power ratings with the line ratings.
(c) A second condition to be verified before any maximum generator power increase is that the mean generator power margin has reached a threshold value. That is, we define the mean generator power margin at a time t as
where P 0 is the initial power load demand. is not verified, we choose another node at random and iterate. After power has been added to a node, we use Eq. (4) to recalculate the mean generator power margin and continue the process until DP/P is above the prescribed quantity DP P c ( ) .
4. We also assign a probability p 0 for a random outage of a line. This value represents possible failures caused by phenomena such as accidents and weather related events.
After applying these four rules to the network, we look for a solution of the power flow problem by using LP, as described in Appendix A.
It is also possible to introduce a time delay between the detection of a limit in the generation margin and the increase in maximum generator power. This delay would represent construction time. However, the result is the same as increasing the value of k in Eq. (3), which can also give an alternative interpretation for k.
Five basic parameters control the dynamics of this model. One is the rate of increase in power demand, l, which we keep fixed at 1.8% per year on the basis of the averaged value for the U.S. grid in the last two decades. 22 A second parameter is the improvement rate of the transmission grid, m. This is not an easy parameter to estimate. However, once m is given, there is a self-regulation process by which the system produces the number of blackouts that would stimulate the engineering response needed to meet demand. This is a necessary condition for the dynamical equilibrium of the system. The rate of increase in power demand for the overall system is essentially given by R N
where f blackout is the frequency of blackouts and l o is a weighted average of the number of lines overloaded during a blackout.
Dynamical equilibrium implies that R R D R
= . That is, the increase in demand and the corresponding increase in power supply must be matched by improvements in the transmission grid. Because those improvement are in response to real or simulated blackouts, this relation implies that m must be greater than l; otherwise, the system would be collapsing with constant blackouts. In the numerical calculations and for the value of the growth demand of 1.8% per year, we found that, in order to avoid this collapse regime, m must be > 1.01. In the present calculations, we keep this parameter in the range 1.01 to 1.1. In this regime, results depend weakly on this parameter.
A third parameter is the ratio G of the minimal generator power margin DP P c ( ) to the maximum fluctuation of the load demand g P Pe P e
where, P D is the actual load demand that fluctuates around the mean value and g is simply related to the parameter g . The parameter G is the main parameter varied in the calculations presented here. The generator power capability margin has a wide variation over the years, but an estimated mean value 22 falls into the range of 15% to 30%.
The fourth parameter is the probability of an outage caused by a random event (p 0 ).
This parameter can be used to partially control the frequency of blackouts, although there is not a linear relation between them. The fifth parameter is the probability for an overloaded line to undergo an outage (p 1 ). We keep this parameter in the range
Each calculation is done for a specific network configuration. We will use idealized tree networks, which were discussed in Ref. 8 , as well as more realistic networks, such as the IEEE 118 bus network depicted in Fig. 1 .
The time evolution of a power transmission system by this model leads to a steadystate regime. Here "steady state" is defined with relation to the slow dynamics of the blackouts because the power demand is constantly increasing, as shown in Fig. 2 . The time evolution in the model shows a transient period followed by steady-state evolution.
This is illustrated in Fig. 2 
Dynamical evolution of the power transmission model
Looking at the time evolution of the different parameters that characterize the blackouts, one observes a noisy signal that could be taken as random. One could think that this is the situation because many of the blackouts are triggered by random events with probability p 0 . However, that is not the case. There are significant space and time correlations resulting from the dynamics of the power transmission model. In Ref. 7, we studied the critical points of the power transmission model as the total load demand was varied. The slow dynamics described in Sect. 2 were not modeled. We found two types of critical points: one type was related to the limiting power flows in the transmission lines; the other type was related to the limit in the power generation. When these types of critical points are close to each other, the probability distribution of the blackout size as measured by the amount of load shed has a power tail. Away from the critical point, the PDFs do not show such power tails.
When the dynamical evolution over long time scales is included and the value of G is about 1, the system evolves to a situation in which these critical points are close to each other. Therefore, the PDFs of the power shed have well-developed power tails. These
PDFs are shown in Fig. 5 , where we have plotted the PDFs of the load shed normalized to the total power demand for three different tree configurations. These distribution functions are compared with those obtained from a load scan without dynamical evolution when the load value was at the critical point. We cannot distinguish between the two calculations; the PDFs are practically the same. In Fig. 5 , we have given an arbitrary shift to the PDFs for a given size network to better observe the three different cases.
For the PDF of the power shed, the power-law-scaling region increases with the number of nodes in the network. The power decay index is practically the same for the four networks and is close to -1.2. The particular values of the decay index for each tree network are given in Table I , in which the range of the power tail region is defined as the ratio of the maximum load shed to the minimum load shed described by the power law.
From the values obtained for the four networks listed in Table I, This overlap indicates that the dynamical model described in Sect. 2 leads to operation of the system close to the critical points. A similar result has been obtained for the IEEE 118 bus network.
The forms of these PDFs, or at least their power tails, seem to have a universal character. Therefore, we can compare the PDF of the normalized load shed obtained for the largest network with the PDF of the blackouts obtained in the analysis of the 15 years of NERC data. 4 In Fig. 6 , we have plotted the PDF of the NERC data together with the PDFs for the 382-node tree and IEEE 118 bus networks. We have normalized the blackout size to the largest blackout over the period of time considered. We can see that the present model, regardless of the network configuration, reproduces well the functional form obtained from the data. The level of agreement between the power tails of these two PDFs is remarkable and indicates that the dynamical model for series of blackouts has captured some of the main features of the data.
Dynamical regimes
Calculations carried out with this model show the existence of two different dynamical regimes. The first regime is characterized by the low value of G (that is, a low generator capability margin and/or large fluctuations in the power demand). In this regime, the available power is limited and has difficulties in meeting demand. Blackouts and brownouts are frequent, but they affect few loads. In this regime, there are very few line outages. In the opposite limit, G is large and the blackouts are less frequent, but they tend to involve multiple line outages when they happen. This latter regime is interesting because there are many cascading events that can cause blackouts in a large part of the network. This suggests a possible separation between regimes of few failures and regimes with cascading failures.
Let us investigate in a quantitative way the separation between these two regimes by varying the parameter G. Varying G is not necessarily a realistic way of modeling the transmission system but it allows us to understand some features of the dynamics of the model. For several tree networks, we have done a sequence of calculations for different values of the minimal generator power margin DP P c ( ) at a constant g. We have
Looking at averaged quantities is not a good way of identifying the demarcation between single failures and cascading events. To have a better sense of this demarcation,
we have calculated the PDF of the number of line outages per blackout. In Fig. 8 , we have plotted these PDFs for different values of G. The calculation was done for a 94-node tree network. We can see that at very low G there is a clear peak at 4 outages per blackout with very low probability for blackouts with more than 10 outages per blackout.
As G increases, a second peak at about 17 outages emerges and the high of the peak increases with G. At the highest G value, this second peak is comparable to the peak at low number outages per blackout. In Fig. 9 , we have plotted the ratio of the frequency of blackouts with more than 15 outages to the mean frequency of blackouts. We can see that for G > 1, this ratio reaches 0.007. This gives a measure of the frequency of what we can consider large scale blackouts (more than a 16% of the whole grid). We can apply this result to the U.S. grid, taking into account that the average frequency of blackouts is one every 13 days. In the low-G regime, the ratio is about 0.001; this would imply that a large scale blackout is likely every 35 years. In the high-G regime, the ratio goes up to 0.007; this implies a frequency of one every 5 years.
Conclusions
The The dynamical behavior of this model has important implications for power system planning and operation and for the mitigation of blackout risk. The present model has some of the characteristic properties of an SOC system, although we cannot prove that is strictly the case. The success of mitigation efforts in SOC systems is strongly influenced by the dynamics of the system. One can understand SOC dynamics as including opposing forces that drive the system to a "dynamic equilibrium" near criticality in which disruptions of all sizes occur. Power tails are a characteristic feature of this dynamic equilibrium. Unless the mitigation efforts alter the self-organization forces driving the system, the system will be pushed to criticality. To alter those forces with mitigation efforts may be quite difficult because the forces are an intrinsic part of our society. Then the mitigation efforts can move the system to a new dynamic equilibrium while remaining near criticality and preserving the power tails. 5 Thus, while the absolute frequency of disruptions of all sizes may be reduced, the underlying forces can still cause the relative frequency of large blackouts to small blackouts to remain the same. 
Appendix A
The blackout model is based on the standard DC power flow equation,
where F is a vector whose N L components are the power flows through the lines, F ij , P is a vector whose N N -1 components are the power of each node, P i , with the exception of the reference generator, P 0 , and A is a constant matrix. The reference generator power is not included in the vector P to avoid singularity of A as a consequence of the overall power balance.
The input power demands are either specified deterministically or as an average value plus some random fluctuation around the average value. The random fluctuation is applied to either each load or to "regional" groups of load nodes.
The generator power dispatch is solved using standard LP methods. Using the input power demand, we solve the power flow equations, Eq. (A-1), with the condition of minimizing the following cost function:
We assume that all generators run at the same cost and that all loads have the same priority to be served. However, we set up a high price for load shed by setting W at 100.
This minimization is done with the following constraints:
This linear programming problem is numerically solved by using the simplex method as implemented in. 25 The assumption of uniform cost and load priority can of course be relaxed, but changes to the underlying dynamics are not likely from this.
In 
